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Original Research Article
Engaging with ethics in Internet of
Things: Imaginaries in the social milieu
of technology developers
Funda Ustek-Spilda1 , Alison Powell1 and Selena Nemorin2
Abstract
Discussions about ethics of Big Data often focus on the ethics of data processing: collecting, storing, handling, analysing
and sharing data. Data-based systems, however, do not come from nowhere. They are designed and brought into being
within social spaces – or social milieu. This paper connects philosophical considerations of individual and collective
capacity to enact practical reason to the influence of social spaces. Building a deeper engagement with the social
imaginaries of technology development through analysis of two years of fieldwork with start-ups working on Internet
of Things, this paper suggests that different action positions can emerge, with consequences for how data is understood
and valued. The Disengaged, Pragmatist and Idealist ethical action positions identified in the paper reveal the ways
individuals and groups negotiate possibilities for ethical action, through justifications, explanations and structuring of
system features.
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Introduction
Discussions about ethics of Big Data often focus on the
ethics of data processing – ‘generation, recording, cur-
ation, processing, dissemination, sharing and use’ using
algorithms (including machine learning and artiﬁcial
intelligence) as well as corresponding practices such as
programming, hacking and coding (Floridi and
Taddeo, 2016: 1). Data-based systems, however, do
not come from nowhere. This article shifts the focus
of ethical discussion to the contexts of data production,
particularly the ethical qualities of the social milieu in
which data-intensive technologies are produced, and
the practical reasoning that people undertake as they
negotiate these social milieu, identifying that uncer-
tainty and contingency in these spaces may be one
reason that eﬀorts to bring ethics into technology
may not yet have borne fruit.
We focus on Internet of Things (IoT), a framework
for data-producing connected technologies that grew
from experiments with internet-connected machines in
the 1980s. Since then, references to IoT and ‘connected
worlds’ have permeated corporate discourse (Cisco,
2011; Thibodeaux, 2017) evoking a new kind of ‘digital
sublime’ (Mosco, 2005). This contributes to a social
milieu where, as Mansell (2012) argues, dominant
social imaginaries stress the value of information (and
data) as intellectual property, creating business models
based on extensive data extraction and processing. For
us, a social imaginary is ‘an ethos that enables people to
make sense of developments in a society’ that can create
‘a shared sense of the legitimacy of the organization
and conduct of a society’ (Mansell, 2012: 32–33).
Within these imaginaries can develop particular moral
reﬂections that guide social action. Not speciﬁcally
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ideological, these work implicitly because they are
taken for granted. In this article, we focus on this
moral aspect, using concepts from the virtue ethics
tradition to provide greater speciﬁcity on how this
implicit moral reﬂection occurs, and its implications.
The ethical social milieu of Internet of Things
development
Increasingly, ethical issues concerning protection of
personal information, freedom of action, ownership
of data and self-determination have attracted attention
(Mansell, 2012) along with issues related to bias, dis-
crimination and justice. Connected and autonomous
system design can also make it diﬃcult to identify
responsibilities and liabilities (Jasanoﬀ, 2017; Taylor,
2017; Van der Ploeg, 2003). To better identify how
IoT developers make ethical decisions in context, we
focus on small companies and start-ups, which are con-
strained by expectations about rapid ﬁnancial success
through competitive innovation in creating IoT tech-
nologies. Unlike large corporations, start-ups have lim-
ited administrative, human and legal resources at their
disposal and hence limited capacity for comprehensive
ethical assessments. They also face uncertainty in their
businesses, with an expectation that the majority of
them will fail within two years after launch. We won-
dered whether these uncertainties would contribute to a
social space with a diﬀerent orientation to ethics than
that of the big companies, which have made public
commitments to principles of ethics by convening
ethics advisory boards and publishing aspirational eth-
ical guidelines but then dissolving these boards or defer-
ring responsibilities to content creators (Financial
Times, 2018; Murgia and Shrikanth, 2019; Waters,
2019). While inﬂuential, it is unclear whether these
guidelines and advisory organisations shift IoT busi-
ness development towards ethical and responsible
innovation.
In this paper, we aim to address two gaps in the
literature. First, we move away from analysing top-
down eﬀorts to deﬁne ethics made by powerful actors
and instead examine the social spaces occupied by small
companies. Second, we take a practice-based approach
to ethics employing the virtue ethics tradition to assess
the practices that people employ in engaging with ethics
in technology development. This is necessary in order
to expand the range of ethical perspectives used to ana-
lyse data-intensive processes, to ensure that ethical
questions are considered fully and from a range of
perspectives.
Our analysis is based on two years of multi-site
ethnographic ﬁeldwork with developers in/of IoT
start-ups based in London, Barcelona, Geneva,
Copenhagen and Belgrade as part of the VIRT-EU
Project: Values and Ethics in Innovation for
Responsible Technology in Europe. We attended indus-
try meetups, hardware and software showcases, work-
shops and conferences, followed an accelerator
programme and conducted in person interviews and
co-design workshops with IoT developers, designers
and entrepreneurs, undertaking more than 100 unique
ﬁeldwork visits between 2016 and 2018. As part of a
related study, we were also able to examine ten years of
data from the records of the IoT Meetups in Europe,
and also conduct ethnographic research into London
IoT Meetup group. Here, we present ethnographic
material in the form of interview excerpts, ethnographic
ﬁeld notes and case study vignettes to illustrate the
practice of ethics within IoT development and design.
These are the result of several rounds of thematic
coding and ethnographic analysis, with the ﬁrst ori-
ented towards the ways that ethics are expressed, and
the second focused on positions within the social
milieu, involving the development of ethnographic
vignettes. These two rounds of coding and interpretive
work followed the ﬁrst round of ﬁeldwork in 2016–
2017. A third round of coding occurred with the add-
ition of new ﬁeldwork material in 2018, and focused on
identifying ethical action positions. In these three
rounds of coding, we asked: how do developers in
start-ups and small companies practice ethical deci-
sion-making within the social spaces they engage in?
What are the technological, business and social con-
texts that inﬂuence these practices?
To answer these questions, we begin with a concep-
tual framework grounded in the virtue ethics tradition
of Alasdair MacIntyre and Elizabeth Anscombe,
focused on ethical practice within what MacIntyre
calls social milieu, or spaces where people build
shared understandings of appropriate actions
(Anscombe, 1958, 2005; MacIntyre, 2016, 1999). As
explained earlier, we investigate these milieux as ways
to foreground and investigate the modes of moral
reﬂection within social imaginaries.
We present three diﬀerent positions that individuals
may take within the social milieu of technology devel-
opment. These positions are the Disengaged, the
Pragmatist and the Idealist. Each position – or action
position – holds the capacity for alternative social ima-
ginaries to ﬂourish, as well as constraining action. By
presenting these three perspectives, we show how data
ethics are not only performed through data processing,
but also through negotiations within social spaces.
Expanding ethical approaches to
data-based technologies
In an article published in this journal, Andrej Zwitter
notes that Big Data poses important challenges to
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moral agency, namely, free will and individualism. In
addition, it can alter power dynamics by redeﬁning
relationships in relation to connectedness and combin-
ing these with risks related to privacy and proﬁling
(Zwitter, 2014: 2–3). Zwitter’s account, along with
others examining technology and information, con-
cerns the consequences of actions (i.e. consequentialist
ethics) (Berdichevsky and Neuenschwander, 1999).
Ethical frameworks, however, operate in many ways
as collateral realities: they would cease to exist, without
those practicing them and turning what is being done
into what necessarily has to be done (Law, 2009: 14).
Therefore, this article takes a practice-based approach
to ethics employing ideas from virtue ethicists, and
focuses on the process of constructing practical reason-
ing in relation to the ethics of IoT. Charles Taylor’s
(1995) explication of this approach identiﬁes how this
process of reasoning unfolds in understanding of scien-
tiﬁc knowledge, speciﬁcally in a context of rapid soci-
etal, technological and economic change. Hence, our
framework foregrounds the importance of examining
practical reasoning and ethical actions, because ethical
evaluations based on the implications of data process-
ing do not fully account for how ethical reasoning and
assumptions come to be established in the ﬁrst place.
From this constructivist position, we take up virtue
ethics as a perspective that can be developed in parallel
to and in connection with the related ‘values in design’
frameworks (Coleman, 2012; Coles and Norman, 2005;
JafariNaimi et al., 2015; Powell, 2016; Shilton, 2018),
allowing us to processes that sustain, reinforce or chal-
lenge decisions made when building new technologies.
We are primarily interested in inquiring into the values
and virtues articulated and practiced by people who
develop new technologies, rather than approaches
that focus on consequences of the technologies once
they are built (Vallor, 2010: 158).1
One approach to examining technology development
may be in relation to claims and eﬀorts at goodness –
the realm of virtue ethics. This ethical tradition can be
traced back to the philosophical writings of Plato,
Aristotle, Socrates as well as Stoics and Cynics. It is
concerned with questions such as ‘What is a good
life’, ‘What does it mean to be a good person’. In the
mid-20th century, Elizabeth Anscombe advocated a
return to virtue ethics to address the blind spots of
moral philosophy which was largely consequentialist
and focused on the ﬁnal utility of individual actions
as the site of judgement (Anscombe, 1958, 2005).
Anscombe advocated consideration of how an ethical
person would behave when faced with a particular eth-
ical dilemma. Such a positioning holds a commitment
to concepts such as excellence and virtue over implica-
tions, utility or greatest good for the greatest number
(Anscombe, 1958, 2005).
Recent work in virtue ethics has built on Anscombe
to develop more speciﬁc discussion on the relationship
between an ethical agent’s character and their engage-
ment with principles, rules and responsibilities within
their own social context. MacIntyre (2016), in particu-
lar, has developed the notion that a virtuous agent acts
in relation to his or her individual virtues but also in
various collective contexts or ‘social milieu’. These
become sites for the development of practical reason-
ing: individuals and groups from diﬀerent places and
backgrounds engage with the political and ethical rea-
lities of the social milieu they inhabit in various ways.
Central to these processes are questions around the idea
of human ﬂourishing. This opens up a space for reﬂect-
ing on the emotional structure of thoughts and actions
in order to understand what it means for individuals
and groups to make sense of things and to reason as
they do (Williams, 1973). MacIntyre’s unique attention
to the social context makes his philosophical perspec-
tive helpful to articulate with the idea of the social
imaginary.2
We use the invitation to think of virtue ethics as
being enacted within social milieu to analyse how IoT
developers engage in practical reasoning. This lets us
examine which kinds of ethical actions become pos-
sible. This situated understanding of ethics opens a
new space for understanding data-based technologies
and explains how social milieu enables and constrains
certain forms of ethical action.
The creation and use of new technologies produces
new social imaginaries, as described above (Castoriadis,
1997; Mansell, 2012; Taylor, 2004). Here, we follow
MacIntyre’s argument that people act not only in rela-
tion to their own virtues, but also in relation to various
collective contexts (MacIntyre, 2007), creating diﬀerent
action positions. In other words, the relationship
between individual responsibility and ethical action
and broader political and social contexts can shape
and constrain people’s capacity for ‘practical reasoning’
(MacIntyre, 2007, Taylor, 1995). For us, practical rea-
soning includes practices of explanation and argumen-
tation as well as decisions about the structure of
technical systems. This philosophical perspective reson-
ates with other constructivist traditions, providing
means to identify moral and ethical aspects of technol-
ogy-making practices. Speciﬁcally, we situate these
practices in relation to social imaginaries, which pro-
vide diﬀerent ways to negotiate the potentials presented
within technical development. Mansell (2012) describes
how the social imaginaries of technology development
encompass dominant business and innovation-focused
imaginaries as well as their alternatives, while Powell
(2008, 2018) shows how social imaginaries can hold
contradictions as people attempt to negotiate diﬀerent
perspectives on technology. Here, we demonstrate how
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diﬀerent imaginaries emerge and co-exist, and how they
come to be sustained within social milieu. We connect
the social space of moral negotiation (social milieu)
with the space of technology design (social imaginary)
by observing practices of explanation, argument and
technology-making.
All of these practices have been associated with how
values come to be embedded in technology, whether
through infrastructural choices (Shilton, 2018),
standard-setting (Braman, 2010; DeNardis, 2010) or
software and hardware development practices in
open-source culture (Coleman, 2012; Powell, 2016),
and it is possible to assess relationships between par-
ticular practices and values. Previous work has ana-
lysed how argumentation and system design practices
in open source software development not only
expressed values but layered these with moral judge-
ments related to ideal modes of human ﬂourishing
(Powell, 2018).
Here, we extend this discussion of values and design
and directly engage with the idea of social milieu as a
space for ethical engagement, deepening the concept of
the social imaginary of technology. We use MacIntyre’s
evocation of the role of social worlds in shaping how
people develop ideas of the ‘good life’ and ‘responsibil-
ity’ to show how ethical issues related to the develop-
ment of connected devices are framed in particular
terms, often occluding or displacing issues that do not
connect with the perspective of that particular social
milieu, sometimes even inﬂuencing how people are
able to situate their own subjectivity ethically
(MacIntyre, 2007). Our connection between social ima-
ginaries and virtue ethics lets us do two things. First, we
are able to examine the ethical concerns and values of
developers and how these come to be reﬂected in the
technologies they come to build. Second, we can pay
attention to the social contexts as they produce assump-
tions about the capacities and uses of these technolo-
gies. We accomplish this by developing action positions
that illustrate how people imagine their capacity to act
within their social milieu. This helps us expand the
range of ethical perspectives used to reﬂect on and
advance ethical considerations of emerging technolo-
gies, beyond consequentialist approaches, and show
why making the technology industry ‘ethical’ cannot
be a goal in itself.
Disengaged, Pragmatist and Idealist:
Imagining capacities to act
In the previous section, we drew attention to the
importance of social contexts, where organisational
structures and cultural logics help develop and enact
values (and/or virtues). Here we focus on how people
engage with these social contexts, organisational
structures and cultural logics in the ﬁeld of IoT, show-
ing how the social milieu helps to produce diﬀerent
action positions, and how the contingencies of these
positions can be limiting as well as enabling.
Our ﬁndings indicate that the social milieu of tech-
nology development, being strongly focused on innov-
ation, market share and corporate reputation, creates
challenges for direct and explicit engagement with
ethics, which forms a major constraint to systemic
change in this area. Many people we spoke to con-
sidered ethics as important but could not ﬁnd means
to engage directly with ethical issues. As such, ethical
conduct was rarely discussed in the online or oﬄine
encounters we observed.
Three positions we observed in our ﬁeldwork illus-
trate points of engagement with ethical or moral con-
cerns. These fold around particular kinds of action and
we refer to them as action positions. They are, the
Disengaged, the Pragmatist and the Idealist. Within
the Disengaged position, many IoT developers
described their space of action as demanding action
on issues relating to ﬁnance and business sustainability,
remaining ambivalent about the ‘use’ of ethics in tech-
nology development beyond compliance with legal
regulation. A Pragmatist position advocated employing
ethical principles pragmatically in response to external
structural forces including increasing demand from
consumers for ethical products, the need for data priv-
acy and security, or changes in corporate governance as
a means of mitigating ﬁnancial liability. An Idealist
position advocated action on values and principles by
embedding them into products and business ventures
they built or social networks. These positions are of
course not the only ones that are available to people
in these spaces, but include the most signiﬁcant direc-
tions of engagement observed within our ﬁeldwork. We
outline the orientation towards action associated with
each of these positions in relation to explanations,
arguments and technology design choices.
The Disengaged: We can’t do ethics as it may slow
down innovation
Our analysis suggests that ethics-by-design may be
much-celebrated yet little acted-upon. Many people
we spoke to were disengaged from the problems or
potentials of ethical thinking by the perceived necessity
to deliver particular products or reach investment mile-
stones in their business development. This was espe-
cially true if they had raised investments through
private equity ﬁrms (e.g. venture capitalists) or private
investors (e.g. Angel investors). A feeling of being
pressed for time, along with this ﬁnancial concern,
removed ethics from some people’s agendas: in some
cases, we observed apathy towards ethics (participants
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explained that ethical deliberation slowed down the cre-
ative process). In other cases, we heard about the
importance of ethics followed by a qualiﬁed ‘. . .but’.
For instance, a developer who is one of the three co-
founders of a wearable tech company that integrates
IoT into sports-wear told us that she would be inter-
ested in thinking about ethics, ‘but investors do not
care about ethics, they care about actual products’.3
Through participation in an accelerator program, her
company was trying to ‘aggressively raise money’ to be
able to stay aﬂoat until the next investment round.
Similarly, in a round-table of technology investors, pro-
fessionals in international development and IoT system
designers, an IoT designer pointed out the importance
of ethics and how companies should design products
with ethics in mind from the outset ‘but’ also gave a
warning.4 He said that Google hired an ethicist to help
them with incorporating ethical design to the new tech-
nologies they are working on, but shortly afterwards
ﬁred him, because ‘he asked too many diﬃcult ques-
tions’ and this, according to him, had slowed down
innovation processes.
In our study, the broader technology development
social milieu in which these developers socialised rarely
allowed room for engaging in ethical discussions
beyond those speciﬁed by laws and regulations.
Although there was little discussion of this principle
before its introduction as an enforceable principle,
once the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) came into force in May 2018, par-
ticipants taking this position began to explain privacy
concerns not as broad ethical issues but as concerns
about compliance with principles identiﬁed in the regu-
lation.5 To illustrate, within the nearly 90 meetups held
by IoT London Meetup Group in the last 10 years, our
analysis indicated that ethics has featured as a topic
only once, while meetups focused on GDPR compli-
ance were much more common.
In short, we identiﬁed distraction from and disen-
gagement towards broader discussions about ethics,
with a tendency to orient discussions towards what is
required by law. The assumption that innovation works
in a ‘beta version’, pushed out before being fully tested
and in anticipation of improved future versions, was
often used as a justiﬁcation for a disengagement with
potential ethical risks of technologies. Moreover,
Facebook’s motto ‘move fast and break things’ was
extended to ethical action. It was presumed that
things might go wrong, but technology would be
there to ‘ﬁx it’.6
The inherent uncertainty of start-up development,
coupled with the push from investors to deliver and
make a viable market intervention, was suggested as
the main reason for not prioritising ethical concerns.
Disengagement, therefore, did not always suggest
unwillingness to engage in ethical discussions
(though in some cases it did); rather, this action pos-
ition was inﬂuenced by the social milieu prioritising the
survival of business and the generation of proﬁt. The
ethical underpinnings or implications of technologies
were often therefore discussed in relation to commercial
and ﬁnancial concerns and often became secondary to
them.
The Pragmatist: Ethics as a business interest
In the second action position, the Pragmatist, a prac-
tical perspective is adopted for ethical decision-making.
This practical position is framed in relation to increas-
ing demand from consumers for ethical products or the
need for strong governance of data privacy and secur-
ity. This action position places ethical concerns
squarely in relation to business interests, but not sub-
sumed by them. We heard that ethics provided new
market opportunities or allowed businesses to limit
ﬁnancial liability, and observed how these ‘pragmatic’
concerns inﬂuenced technological design.
For example, in a product showcase in London, it
became apparent that several companies had decided to
completely de-anonymise their data to comply with the
GDPR.7 Removing their responsibility for personal
data spared them from having to ‘do ethics’ as one of
the developers from an industrial IoT start-up told us.8
We heard various ways that personal private data could
be aggregated and anonymised in order to comply with
the Regulation, though much less about why private
data might need to be anonymised to begin with.
In our study, it was a widely shared view that data is
valuable, and that even if it did not appear valuable at
present, it might become valuable in the future. For
instance, we heard many references to the Roomba
Robot Vacuum Cleaner; how the company stored
data on individual homes but did not use the data
until a third party oﬀered to purchase it (Astor,
2017). Roomba thus became both a hardware company
and data processing company.
In response to examples like this, developers
expressed that they just needed ethics to be more
‘doable’, given their ﬁnancial, time and human resource
limitations, and given their perception of the uncer-
tainty of future business decisions and directions.
An eﬀort at constructing a kitemark recognising eth-
ical capacities illustrates how this position enacts its
version of pragmatism. The Open IoT Trust Mark pro-
ject started with the intention to create a visible or
traceable trade or kite-mark for connected devices
that would indicate the device bearing the mark
would adhere to certain ethical standards, including
governance and management of personal data, and sus-
tainability of materials used for manufacture.9 Indeed,
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values such as honesty, justice, courage, care, wisdom,
ﬂexibility and magnanimity (Vallor, 2016) underpinned
the goals of the group that started the Mark. A partici-
pant in one of the IoT Mark meetings positioned eth-
ical values as necessary for business:
While IoT innovation is important, fundamental human
values must be preserved and respected. They must not be
seen as a burden. This requires a cultural change of mind-
set. We need a social contract.10
Although other participants whom we observed seemed
in agreement, what transpired was not a normative shift
to incorporate ethics into the design and development
of IoT. Rather, it appeared that diﬀerent ethical pos-
itions became diﬃcult to imagine, let alone negotiate,
within the social milieu associated with the Mark’s
development. This action position thus stressed a prag-
matic approach to ethics, and ‘doability’ or ‘implement-
ability’ became the main assessment criterion of the
Mark’s principles.11
Here, it is important to consider the possible space
for action in relation to a particular social imaginary,
and the extent to which this may or may not be able to
challenge the social structures that could constrain eth-
ical agency or ethical action. We observed during the
ﬁve IoT Mark workshops held over two years that the
loudest voices came from the software developers who
outweighed other members by a large margin in terms of
profession, gender and race (i.e. young-to-middle-aged
white male engineers). These voices advocated for prag-
matic interpretations of principles that could be easily
adapted by businesses, and they clearly noted that
unless business concerns were central to ethical discus-
sions, they were bound to be ignored. They argued for
features like security and pushed back on principles that
could have undermined existing business practices.
When deﬁning the assessment criteria for the principles,
they also voted for extremely speciﬁc, itemised list of
actions that could be ‘ticked oﬀ’, rather than questions
that provoked deeper engagement with ethical issues. In
short, they removed divergent ethical principles from
theMark to avoid impacting business capacity to innov-
ate or proﬁt. We observed that the principles chosen for
the Mark and their assessment criteria were similar to
the guidelines already in existence in many other docu-
ments which highlighted the need for security, privacy,
transparency, accountability and interoperability for
IoT devices.12 Indeed, the entire privacy section and
their assessment criteria of the Mark were replaced by
the eight principles of the GDPR.13
We also heard support for the ‘value’ of ethics and
ethics-by-design, given the increasing consumer interest
in ethical and sustainable products. Here, although
‘doing good’ and building ethical products (or products
with a social impact) were portrayed as the main goals,
this was explained in relation to the ‘market opportun-
ity’ for connected IoT products. The emergence of ‘tech
for good’ accelerator programmes, social ventures and
investors oriented towards social causes addressed
through technology were given as illustrations that
‘doing good’ and creating proﬁt were not mutually
exclusive – perhaps even generating signiﬁcant returns
to investors (Chowdhury, 2017). However, participants
foregrounded the potential for social ventures to create
an ‘untapped’ market as a reason to consider ethical
principles.14
To illustrate, consider the story of Company X, a
start-up providing solar-powered batteries to poor
rural populations in order to sustain connectivity of
mobile devices. The company website, displaying
glossy images of Global South populations, promises
to oﬀer ‘Power for All’ and close the ‘digital divide’.
The material explicitly references the UN Millennium
Development Goals, #8F in particular: ‘co-operation
with the private sector, make available the beneﬁts of
new technologies especially information and communi-
cations’ (UN, 2015). Such references suggest the busi-
ness was working towards the aims of social justice and
humanitarianism, by setting up mobile connectivity as a
basic human right (Willems, 2017). As the CEO of the
company, John,15 explained to us, the company came
to focus on providing electricity to power mobile
devices as a speciﬁc business aim. While he acknowl-
edged that access to electricity was an important issue,
he felt that mobile connectivity for the poor was an area
that had untapped potential. He explained:
We needed a high rural population density. We found
that in India a single national entity where the number
of people living in rural areas amounted to more than the
next ten national entities combined.16
When prompted about motivations for starting the
business, John was frank about not actually being moti-
vated by an orientation to ethical principles, although
helping poorer populations was certainly a by-product
of the endeavour. While he believed in an ethical obli-
gation to live a good life, such as deriving meaning from
environmental stewardship and care for fellow beings, his
motivation for the business was fuelled by a desire to
make money: ﬁnding an economic need and creating a
successful company to ﬁll the gap. As he put it:
I think my views on development are controversial,
maybe unpopular. I believe that you can either be a char-
ity or a business, not both. Anything that tries to do both
does neither well. There is no third way. I know ‘the
capitalist’ is considered a bad word, but to be honest,
I’m a capitalist.
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In this context, Company X seemed to be viewing IoT
connectivity as an opportunity to enter the business of
development, echoing a similar sentiment to that
of Mark Nelson, the Director of Stanford’s Peace
Innovation Lab:
If you can measure something, you can design for it; if
you can design for it, you can create new value, if you can
create new value, you can monetise it. Our aim is to
create peace businesses (Taylor and Broeders, 2015).
Indeed, this take on ethics as a means to an end reso-
nated with the strategies of several other developers we
interviewed and start-ups we visited. Privacy, for
instance, was often explained as a means to gain con-
sumer trust and hence gain traction in a market, while
declarations of environmental principles could be used
to obtain funding and investments.17 In this respect,
virtuous aims such as humanitarianism could never be
taken at face value. Instead, they seemed to carry more
fundamental values including the importance of busi-
ness expansion. While some developers reﬂected on
whether this was ‘ethics washing’ (or ‘green washing’
when related to environmental issues), they still stressed
that ‘practically speaking’, this was what the investors
and consumers/users went for, so did they.18 They rea-
soned that if social good was a by-product of innov-
ation and investment, it was better than nothing.
The virtues demonstrated within the Pragmatist
social milieu hinge on ‘mutually beneﬁcial exchange’.
Where MacIntyre strongly criticised the idea of a
market economy exhibiting virtuous behaviours
(MacIntyre, 2016), other ethicists argue that the
values of cooperation and exchange (Miller, 2017) as
well as expression of freedom through the exercise of
choice (Zupan, 2011) are part of market dynamics; but
also creating ‘value’ through creating a business and
job opportunities.19 Virtue ethicist Shannon Vallor
(2016) explores how virtue ethics relates to technology,
but her assessment does not clearly identify the role of
business and markets. In our case, the virtues of the
social milieu transcended those of individuals, and
determined the ways that they explained their decisions.
In such a context, ethics mattered once it was
embedded into and carried by business interests.
The Idealist: Ethics as market disruptor
Unlike the Disengaged and the Pragmatist, some IoT
developers situate themselves as making an intervention
in what they see as the overly business-led perspective
of the technology industry. These developers told us
that they would like to build products with diﬀerent
ideals in mind, or at least start a critique, suggesting
that they felt capable of expressing more virtuous
positions. A series of IoT manifestos advanced some
of these perspectives (Fritsch et al., 2018) and some
developers we interviewed also positioned themselves
and their individual trajectories along these lines. The
Idealist action position includes developers who would
like to challenge the main discourse in start-up world,
demonstrating strong attachment to ethical values and
are motivated by the lack of debate in the tech world
about the kinds of futures developers are building, one
product at a time. The ethical perspective here frames
ethics as a relational, human-centric activity and ethical
acts as a narrative construction, as an ‘individual-in-
relationships’ rather than an isolated single person
(Vallor, 2016: 57). We observed a strong identiﬁcation
with ‘we’ rather than ‘I’. Respondents stressed learning
from the mistakes of one another, growing together
collectively towards the attainment of shared ideals as
values that bring them together. Here, we began to
see the possibility of separating (and integrating) indi-
vidual and collective subjectivities in relation to ethical
concerns, and also an active engagement with the
responsibility for producing ethical technologies (and
futures).
Marcus, a developer in his forties, had worked in the
tech and design industry for over twenty years. He pro-
posed ‘deconstruction’ as a new ethical paradigm for
thinking about IoT design and development, referring
to the redesign of Information and Communications
Technology networks in a decentralised manner so
that citizens could gain more control over their data
and become aware of the implications of their connect-
ivity.20 When asked about why he developed this
‘alternative’ thinking to technology decision-making,
Marcus alluded to his own experience growing up
next to a French border, on the German side of
Strasbourg. While the border separating two countries
certainly existed, it was also, to Marcus, ‘never really
there’. As a result of his personal freedom to easily
move between two countries, the idea of borders
appeared as an artiﬁcial division, a way of segregating
people economically, politically and culturally through
arbitrary means. As Marcus notes, ‘This whole way of
ordering the world seemed to create more issues than
not’. Indeed, various developers we spoke to explained
that they thought technology created artiﬁcial borders,
as algorithms created black-boxed systems which non-
developers could not understand. ‘Giving people their
data back’ was identiﬁed as a potential ethical solution
in our study, either in the form of data-boxes or in the
form of full management rights where individuals are
given the power to keep or ‘trade’ their own data. As
one developer working in an individual data trading
start-up explained, ‘This idea may never work. But we
need to try it to prove that other ways of thinking are
possible’.21
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This contextual understanding of ethics often came
with a critical approach to the tendency to equate data
with truth (Rieder and Simon, 2016). According to
Marcus, for instance, data should not be interpreted
as a ‘one size ﬁts all’ solution. This speaks to the
increasing tendency of government and industry to
mine ‘truth’ from vast amounts of data collected from
(IoT) sensors. Vallor (2016) makes a similar point when
she observes that any kind of truth always has a con-
text: ‘We cannot respect truth by stripping it of all ref-
erence to the concrete worldly situations that make it
true’ (179). She has also evoked the danger of techno-
social ‘lock-in’ emphasising that we should be mindful
of the ‘gradual hardening of certain technical design
choices that over time become increasingly diﬃcult to
undo, modify, or improve upon, as other systems, tools
and practices are built to work with that initial choice’
(Vallor, 2016: 217). Indeed, several developers we spoke
to stressed the often unacknowledged importance
of ‘path dependency’ in technology. Sinister Kitty, a
co-founder of an IoT middleware company, for
instance, explained that he and his partner sought to
‘deconstruct’ the way IoT technologies speak to one
another through disrupting the very communication
technologies they are part of.22 They used blockchain
in the design of their middleware to, as they explained,
foreground the necessity of security.
In addition to rebuilding systems, some developers
also explained that technology industry business
models need to be ‘disrupted’ in order to address
ongoing ethical issues. Developers who considered
themselves as creating a diﬀerent non-market-based/
oriented social milieu often highlighted that their activ-
ities revolve around ‘pushing back’ against ‘the system’.
This illustrates the idea that ‘the likelihood that know-
ledge will be transmitted depends on the social organ-
isation of knowledge, storage technology and who
controls access to it’ (Mokyr, 2002: 8). Here, some
developers stressed the importance of paying attention
to both technology development and technology trans-
fer. For instance, a developer working on tracking
devices for wildlife conservation questioned what
would happen if someone took his technology and
adapted it to humans.23 He said that he could imagine
implications of tracking all activities of human life,
including but not limited to invasion to personal priv-
acy, as well as expanded surveillance and control, even
if he was not certain that these risks would transpire.
Another developer, who created a wearable technology
for individuals with speech diﬃculties, described that
she did not want her technology to be used in the enter-
tainment industry – despite the potential ﬁnancial bene-
ﬁt – since this would go against ‘the whole reason’ she
set up her company: helping vulnerable individuals and
their families.24 She explained it was not money but her
own ideals that mattered to her. Similarly, another
developer who owns an IoT design studio in
Amsterdam told us how he resisted putting facial rec-
ognition technologies into his products, although cli-
ents found them ‘cool’ or ‘cutting-edge’. This play of
context echoes what Vallor refers to as ‘practical
wisdom’: a kind of moral excellence exhibited by indi-
viduals and groups whose lives ‘are guided by appro-
priate feeling and intelligence, rather than mindless
habit or rote compulsion to follow ﬁxed moral scripts
provided by religious, political or cultural institutions’
(Vallor, 2016: 25).
The spaces for the exercise of practical reason that
we identiﬁed demonstrated that feeling and intelligence
needed to be negotiated against the expectations and
constraints of the environment. This included the abil-
ity of developers to ‘go against the ﬂow’,25 to perceive
what ethical dilemmas might emerge from the technol-
ogies they are building, or to negotiate their ethical
behaviour (Vallor, 2016) within a highly competitive
business environment. For instance, ‘disrupting the
market’ by putting ethics ﬁrst could bring ﬁnancial
risks because a start-up might refuse investments from
funds with questionable sources of income – as well as
beneﬁts for individuals who could separate themselves
from companies with values they did not share.26 We
also heard that people negotiated this play of values by
participating in ‘disruptive’ movements through meet-
ups, GitHub forums and other online discussions
while holding a steady job in a company with a more
‘business-as-usual’ perspective on ethics.27
Action positions and the possibilities
of the social milieu
Building on the virtue ethics tradition, which focuses on
MacIntyre’s and Anscombe’s interpretations of the
practical reasoning which people use to determine a
course of action that they consider to be good, our
analysis shows that a range of actions are enabled
and constrained by the social milieu in which people
ﬁnd themselves (Anscombe, 2005; MacIntyre, 1999).
These constraints motivate explanations of the diﬃ-
culty of acting ethically due to expectations of how
their products appear in a market (the Disengaged),
justiﬁcations for interpretations of ethical principles
that ﬁt with consumer interests (the Pragmatist), as
well as seeking to transform the potential design of
IoT systems by rethinking the metaphors and models
that underpin them (the Idealist). As Vallor suggests in
her investigation of virtue ethics in relation to technol-
ogy, design choices for technology are one of the ways
that social milieu structure potential orientations for
practical reason (Vallor, 2010). Therefore, the Idealist
position that we identiﬁed was not a position idealising
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theoretical reason or speculating on potential courses of
action but rather, as with the other positions, engaged
in explanations, reﬂections, arguments and reorienta-
tions of their own products and services.
In light of our analysis, the extent to which individ-
ual subjectivity can inﬂuence the exercise of virtues may
depend on the organisational environment a developer
is embedded in. Acting ethically comprises a form of
knowledge that surpasses a cognitive understanding of
rules and principles to encompass emotional and social
intelligence ‘awareness of the motivations, feelings,
beliefs and desires of others; a sensitivity to the morally
salient features of particular situations’ (Vallor, 2016:
26). Such capacities to act inﬂuence decisions that
might otherwise appear to be inevitable outcomes of
structural tendencies, such as the decision by a start-
up with an original ethos oriented towards ‘creating
better things’ to change direction to address the per-
ceived demands of funding rounds or growth. Action
positions are not determinate, but situational. This
means that constraints are not external things to be
overcome, but intrinsic in the milieu that technology
developers are part of. This goes some way to explain-
ing how ongoing conversations about using ‘technology
for social good’ or ‘business with purpose’ gain traction
while technology products continue to violate privacy,
intensify bias and entrench social power. It is not that
developers do not have virtuous intentions, but that the
milieu structures the space for action in ways that com-
promise moral reﬂection. The implications here for
policy, practice and transformation of the milieu
include the fact that merely introducing ethics as a con-
cern may not allow people to act on virtues that they
hold for themselves and for their ventures, or may con-
strain the ways that they interpret these virtues. There
may be enabling strategies to consider, such as creating
diﬀerent ways of sustaining businesses and opening up
spaces of negotiation for developers to claim diﬀerent
outcomes for their products other than market viability.
Conclusion
Through our examination of the IoT social milieu, we
illustrated the ethical spaces outlined by three diﬀerent
action positions. These action positions illustrate how
ethical thinking and doing unfold through justiﬁcation,
explanation and decisions about how to design techno-
logical systems. The three action positions illustrate
how practical reasoning is practiced and emerges
through individual and collective negotiations within
social spaces. The action positions we observed – the
Disengaged, the Pragmatist and the Idealist – demon-
strate that understandings of how IoT development cul-
tures should (or could) operate shaped how developers
assumed they could act.
In particular, by situating the action positions in
relation to social imaginaries of technology, we identify
the ethical negotiations that underpin the construction
of what appears to be possible for new technological
systems. Our extensive ﬁeldwork within the ecosystem
of small companies illustrates that ethical concerns and
spaces for action in IoT development are set up in rela-
tion to structural factors including assumptions about
business development, policy and regulation (including
the GDPR). These structural factors also include the
relative power of small versus large companies, making
our empirical insights important in understanding the
ethical spaces of action experienced by people working
in start-ups, whose position is associated with greater
potential for innovation and with less inﬂuence on the
structural aspects of business models for data-
processing.
Our speciﬁc focus on the development of IoT sys-
tems is also signiﬁcant because it identiﬁes an important
direction for broader considerations of data ethics
within an emerging technology that is data-processing
heavy. Following a diﬀerent ethical trajectory and
broadening ethical concerns to encompass practices
and processes of development, in addition to conse-
quential concerns relating to data storage, ownership
or surveillance, we demonstrate how contextual and
relational features of social spaces inﬂuence the cap-
acity for people to practically reason and to act.
Structural features of the data-based and connected
environments including economies of data extraction
lead to consequences including surveillance, which in
turn have well-identiﬁed ethical implications including
bias, discrimination and manipulation. These are not in
question.
Our analysis shows that business interest enacts cer-
tain kinds of moral reﬂection and, in some cases, it is
used as a legitimisation for disengagement or for a
more practical turn. In such cases, consumer interest
is put forth as a potential to transform the existing
social milieu – that if consumers pushed for more eth-
ical engagement from the developers, producers and
entrepreneurs of emerging technologies, change might
happen. Similarly, regulation is increasingly suggested
as a means for transformation, that if all businesses are
required to comply, then not engaging with potential
ethical implications of technology design and produc-
tion would cease to oﬀer a competitive edge. We think
this position postpones engagement with ethics and
defers responsibility to future consumers, organisations
and regulations.
Nevertheless, while there is uncertainty here, there is
also space for transformation. The existence of social
milieu does not prescribe that this milieu will constrain
virtuous or transformative action. In fact, the Idealist
action position suggests that there is considerable space
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to work inside social milieu to transform the expect-
ations of business.
This paper contributes to the ﬁeld by showing that
the creation and maintenance of the social spaces
within which ideas about how technologies can and
should be designed are also part of the ethical terrain.
These aspects need more focused attention, and we
identify that philosophical concepts can be deepened
as well as made relevant through a sustained and care-
ful connection to the social imaginaries that motivate
technology development, and the contexts where they
occur.
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Notes
1. Vallor puts it as follows: ‘Virtue ethics provides an inte-
gral but open and dynamic framework in which fruitful
intercultural dialogue about information technology
ethics can take place’ (Vallor, 2010: 158).
2. While Anscombe is considered the mother of modern
virtue ethics, MacIntyre undertook one of the most sus-
tained developments of the Aristotelian tradition of this
ethical approach. Here, we are interested in the space he
creates for discussions of social spaces and their ethical
characteristics. The virtue ethicist most concerned with
technology is Shannon Vallor, whose work we discuss
here.
3. April 2018, London, Wearable Tech Event, Informal
Conversation.
4. June 2018, London, Connected Machines Exploration
Event, Roundtable Participant Observation.
5. April 2018, London, Internet of Things Meetup,
Participant Observation and Informal Conversation.
6. June 2018, London, Connected Machines Exploration
Event, Roundtable Participant Observation.
7. May 2018, London, Internet of Things Meetup,
Participant Observation and Informal Conversation.
8. July 2018, Internet of Things Meetup, London,
Participant Observation and Informal Conversation.
9. The IoT Mark project changed its name to the ‘Better
IoT Mark’ at the time of writing this paper. Here, we
kept their initial project name as the name change has
been very recent and we have observed them as IoT
Mark throughout our project. https://betteriot.word-
press.com/ (Accessed 20 December 2018).
10. March 2017, London, IoT Mark Meeting, Participant
Observation.
11. June 2018, London, IoT Mark Meeting, Participant
Observation.
12. We have followed IoT Mark project for two years,
2017–2018.
13. July 2018, London, IoT Mark Meeting, Participant
Observation.
14. September–December 2018, London, Tech Accelerator
Programme, Participant Observation.
15. All names are changed to protect the anonymity of the
research participants, unless otherwise sought by the par-
ticipants themselves in our consent form.
16. June 2017, London, Interview with John.
17. February–March 2017, Barcelona and London, and
October 2018, London, Industry Meetings, Participant
Observation and Informal Conversation.
18. November 2018, London, Interview with George.
19. June 2018, London, Accelerator Programme Demoday,
Informal Conversation.
20. June 2017, London, Interview with Marcus.
21. June 2018, London, Technology and Innovation Event,
Informal Conversation.
22. August 2018, London, Interview with Sinister Kitty.
23. July 2018, London, IoT Mark Meeting, Participant
Observation.
24. August 2018, London, Interview with Hadeel.
25. October 2018, Belgrade, Hackathon, Participant
Observation and Informal Conversation.
26. October 2018, Belgrade, Participant Observation and
Informal Conversation at Co-working spaces.
27. November 2018, London, Tech Accelerator Programme,
Participant Observation.
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